Abstract. We present a game model for classical PCF, a nite version of PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This model is build from E-dialogues, a kind of two-players game de ned by Lorenzen. In the E-dialogues for classical PCF, the strategies of the rst player are isomorphic to the B ohm trees of the language. We de ne an interaction in E-dialogues and show that it models the weak-head reduction in classical PCF. The interaction is a variant of Coquand's debate and the weak-head reduction is a variant of the reduction in Krivine's Abstract Machine. We then extend E-dialogues to a kind of games similar to Hyland-Ong's games. Interaction in these games also models weak-head reduction. In the intuitionistic case (i.e. without the catch/throw mechanism), the extended E-dialogues are Hyland-Ong's games where the innocence condition on strategies is now a rule. Our model for classical PCF is di erent from Ong's model of Parigot's lambda-mu-calculus. His model works by adding new moves to the intuitionistic case while ours works by relaxing the game rules.
Introduction
We investigate the links between Lorenzen's and Coquand's game-theoretic approach of provability, Hyland-Ong's game-theoretic approach of -calculus, and weak-head reduction as implemented by Krivine's Abstract Machine.
To exemplify these links, we choose as framework the nite B ohm trees of a variant of PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This variant of PCF is classical in the sense that its typing system includes implicational classical logic.
We refer to Felscher 8] for the works of Lorenzen and his school. According to Felscher, the goal of Lorenzen was to give a game-based foundation of intuitionistic logic. Several kinds of two-players games parametrized by formulas were de ned. Of these games, we note one in particular, called E-dialogues in Felscher 8] . As noticed by Lorenzen & Schwemmer 16] , the strategies for the rst player in E-dialogues have a structure of proofs in a certain cut-free sequent 1 Classical Simply-Typed B ohm Trees
We consider a language of B ohm trees for a simply-typed -calculus including constants, a case operator and a catch/throw mechanism (with static binding).
We adopt for the catch and throw operators a syntax (and later a behaviour) reminiscent of Parigot's -calculus 18]. The operator catch is written and the operator throw is written ]. Classical B ohm trees are de ned by the following grammar:
t::= case x(u; :::; u) of (c ! t; :::; c ! t) j ]c u::= x; :::; x: :t The letters x and range over two distinct domains of names and c over the constants in the base types. The x's are called -variables. They are supposed to be distinct in the expression x; :::; x: :. The 's are called -variables (they roughly correspond to entry points of (local) functions). In the case construct, the c's are supposed to be distinct and the t's are called continuations. We will often use a vector notation as in x: :t or case x(ũ) of (c !t).
The objects de ned by the entries t and u are respectively called classical evaluable B ohm trees and classical functional B ohm trees. If u : (`; A), we say that u is a closed B ohm tree of type A. Remarks: 1) The extension to in nite set of constants and/or to non wellfounded B ohm trees poses no di culties. The extension to B ohm trees with unde ned nodes is also direct.
2) We justify our langage of B ohm trees as follows. Let t::= x j (t t) j x:t j c j case t of (c ! Orient the rules from left to right to get a rewriting system. We can show that any typed term reduced to a typed B ohm tree. Up to the 2nd, 3rd and 7th rules, typed B ohm trees are normal. Thus, assuming the con uence of the rewriting system, the typed B ohm trees describe the equivalence classes of typed terms. This justi es the terminology.
3) According to the theory of -calculus in Parigot 18] There are two kinds of rules. The rst rule applies when the computation needs to know the value of a variable x ij . If x ij is bound to u ij = ỹ: :t 0 in e then its argumentsũ are bound to the formal parametersỹ and the current continuationt (what to do when t 0 returns a constant) is bound to the entry point of u ij . The second rule applies when a constant is return to some entry point. The moves d n , with n odd, are called Player's moves or P-moves and the ones with n even are called Opponent's moves or O-moves.
Strategies
Unformally, a strategy for a player is a function mapping legal positions (at which the player is to move) to a move of this player. In a legal position, only the moves of the other player are useful to determine what to move. This leads to the following de nition. Alternatively, a P-strategy can be seen as a (possibly in nite) tree where branches are labelled by O-moves and nodes by P-moves. Moreover, it makes sense to restrict a strategy to what it determines after some point in a play. This leads to the de nition of substrategy in tree form beyond a legal position.
A P-substrategy in tree form beyond is inductively de ned by:
Let Proposition1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies (as dened by the rst de nition) and strategies in tree-form. This correspondence preserves the tree structure of the domains of the strategies.
The notion of P-substrategies in tree form beyond a legal position is a technical notion used to prove the correspondence with B ohm trees. 3 The Model of E-Dialogues Coquand 3] interprets proofs of the \Calculus of Noviko " as strategies in a two-players game. The calculus is a (cut-free) sequent calculus (as LJ and LK of Gentzen) for in nitary logic. The game is as in section 2 except for Opponent: the O-moves must be justi ed by the preceding P-move. Such a game is similar to Lorenzen's classical E-dialogues in Felscher 8] .
Here, we de ne E-dialogues for classical B ohm trees.
E-Dialogues
The E-dialogue G E A interpreting the type A is de ned by its set of legal Epositions. A legal E-position on A is a legal position in G A which satis es the following extra condition: -O-moves are justi ed by the preceding P-move:
For all even n 6 = 0, we have p n = n ? 1.
The justi cations of O-moves are trivial in E-dialogues. We do not write them in the sequel.
An E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the E-dialogue G E A .
Proposition2. E-P-strategies for A and closed functional B ohm trees of type A are isomorphic.
Proof. We show rather the correspondence between E-P-strategies in tree form and numeric B ohm trees. Let be a legal E-position of odd length. Let ? be the set of types asserted by Opponent (and thus attackable by Player) in . Let be the types of the questions asked by Opponent. We tag each type in ? by a pair consisting of the move number when the type was asserted and of the premise index (as in the de nition of numeric B ohm trees). Similarly, we tag each base type in by the move number when the question was asked. We show that E-P-substrategies in tree form beyond are isomorphic to evaluable B ohm trees typed by the sequent (?` ).
For well-founded strategies and B ohm trees, the de nition of the correspondence is by recursion on the tree structure: { A P-attack p i corresponds to an occurrence of the App Finally, the initial move is in correspondence with the top Abs rule of functional B ohm trees. Then, it is direct to show that the correspondence is an isomorphism respecting the tree structure.
Hereafter, we write u for the E-P-strategy associated to the B ohm tree u.
Coquand's Debate
Let be an E-P-strategy for A 1 ; :::; A n !C and~ be a family of E-P-strategies for A 1 ; :::; A n respectively. Since neither and~ are forced to play moves justi ed by the preceding opponent's move, it is not possible to directly let them interact.
Coquand 3] proposed a way to let and~ interact in such a way that the interaction computes a result for C. The idea of Coquand is as follows: at each step of the debate (which is a sequence of moves), there is a canonical way to extract a subsequence which is a legal E-position. From this legal E-position, the E-strategies can be applied. Following Hyland-Ong's terminology 11], we call view the extracted E-position. However, in contrast with 11], when Player (resp Opponent) is to move, we keep in the view only the moves of Opponent (resp Player). This is su cient to apply the E-strategies.
Roughly, the view (typically for P) of a legal position is obtained by forgetting the moves which occur between an O-move and the P-move which justi ed it. Thus, the view transposes the current state of the debate into a subsequence of O-moves in an E-dialogue. From this, the player who is to move can apply its strategy. The view renumbering sequences serve to transpose back the justi cation in the whole position. To express this correspondence, we consider the transposition d wh (u 0 ;ṽ 0 ) of the weak-head reduction into a legal position. We annotate instances of the rst reduction rule by attacks and instances of the second by answers. A superscript on windows is necessary too. At the end, we add a dummy window () ] in the second reduction rule (this simpli es the numbering of windows in the next proof). case x ij (ũ) of (c !t) e] wh(n)= We need rst some de nitions.
We de ne occurrences of evaluable B ohm trees and hat occurrences of functional B ohm trees in a functional B ohm tree u. B ohm subtrees and P-views are in correspondence. To enforce this link, occurrences are taken to be P-views, i.e. sequences of O-moves with the justi cation dropped. If u is a B ohm tree and an occurrence of t in u, we de ne u j as t. Ifṽ is a family of B ohm trees and = m 1 :::m n is an occurrence of t in v i , we let v j im1 :::mn = (v i ) j . Similarly for hat occurrences.
We can now give the proof. { t n = case x(ũ 0 ) of (c 00 !t 00 ) with x = x qij in e n and u qij = x0 : 0 :t 0 r n+1 = t 0 (x 0 ũ0 ; 0 ]c 00 !t 00 ) n+1 e n ]; e qi ]
In this case, we have wh(n + 1) = qi j and V( jn+1 ) = V( jqi ) j .
We show rst that t 0 = t n+1 . We have u qij = (ṽ 0 We show rst that t 0 qij = t n+1 . We have t 0 qij = (ṽ 0 ) jV( jq i )]c j . By de nition of the view, this means t 0 qij = (ṽ 0 ) jV( jn+1 ) as wanted.
We show then that () ]; e qi ] = e n+1 ] = w qr ; :::; w q1 ] with r = jV( jn+1 )j and q i+1 = v jn+1 (i). As above, this comes by induction hypothesis for windows in e qi . Moreover, t n = (u 0 ) jV( jn ) is a constant and w n+1 is actually dummy.
This ends the proof 4 The Model of Spread E-Dialogues
The E-dialogues are highly asymmetrical between Player and Opponent. A liberalization of the rules leads to the spread E-dialogues. These dialogues can be seen as a variant for classical PCF of Hyland-Ong's dialogues (see section 5).
Spread E-Dialogues
We now allow Opponent to play moves justi ed by a P-move which is not the last move of Player. However, to keep a kind of dialogue which constitutes a model, we internalize the determinism w.r.t. the view in the rules of the game. This is the same view same move condition.
The spread E-dialogue G S A associated to A is de ned by its set of legal spread E-positions. A legal spread E-position on A is a legal position = A spread E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the spread E-dialogue G S A . Similarly for an E-O-strategy. A spread E-strategy is either a spread E-P-strategy or a spread E-O-strategy.
E-P-Strategies and Spread E-Strategies
Since the moves in spread E-strategies are determined by the views (which are sequences of O-moves in E-dialogues), we can expect a bijection between E-Pstrategies and spread E-strategies (whatever the strategy is for Player or for Opponent).
In the rest of the section, we consider P-views of sequences of O-moves and O-views of sequences of P-moves. This makes sense since only the knowledge of the moves of other player are relevant in the de nition of the view.
Let be an E-P-strategy for A. Let Dom( ) be the set of sequences of O-moves such that V( ) is in Dom( ). Let be the extension of on Dom( ) de ned by ( ) = v ( (V( ))).
Proposition4. If is an E-P-strategy for A then is a spread E-P-strategy for A.
Similarly, let~ be a family of E-P-strategies for A 1 ; :::; A n respectively. Let Proposition5. If~ is a family of E-P-strategies for A 1 ; :::; A n then~ + is a spread E-O-strategy for A 1 ; :::; A n !C.
Conversely, a spread E-strategy can be restricted into a E-P-strategy by keeping in the domain only the sequences which come from a legal E-position.
Let be a spread E-P-strategy for A. We de ne Dom( ) ? as the set of sequences -Last asked rst answered condition.
Let d n = ] pn c an answer, and n 0 such that p n < n 0 < n. If d n 0 is an attack then there is n 00 such that n 0 < n 00 < n and d n 00 = ] n 0 c 00 for some c 00 . If d n 0 = ] p n 0 c 0 is an answer then p n 0 6 = p n .
Similarly, we get intuitionistic spread E-dialogues by adding the above extra condition to the rules of (classical) spread E-dialogues.
Debate
The de nitions of the debates d E and d S are the same for intuitionistic and classical games. Moreover, the propositions 2 and 3 and the corollaries 7 and 9 still hold in the intuitionistic case.
Intuitionistic spread E-dialogues can be understood as Hyland-Ong's games where the innocence condition on strategies is now a rule of the game. As a consequence, all spread E-O-strategies are innocent in our games and therefore in one-to-one correspondence with families of intuitionistic B ohm trees. On the other side, de nability for Hyland-Ong's games states that even against a noninnocent opponent (for instance a non-deterministic player), we still have the bijection between P-strategies and B ohm trees.
